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Abstract
We propose a quantum-like description of markets and economics.
The approach has roots in the recently developed quantum game the-
ory.
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Introduction One of the biggest scientific revolutions was caused by the
emergence of quantum physics and the consequent falsification of the idea
of the possibility of distinction between observer and observed phenomenon.
Quantum Zeno effect is the most famous case in point [1]. This fact is often
used (without any reference to quantum theory) by social scientists to argue
that their theories are beyond mathematical description. Here we would
like to propose a quantum-like approach to economics whose usefulness, we
think, can be verified only by further investigation. The approach has roots
in the recently developed quantum game theory [2]. For simplicity and clear-
ness of the exposition, we shall suppose that there are only two assets on
the market. The first one, denoted by $, fulfills the role of money and its
unit is 1$. The second one, denoted by G, is distributed in units 1G of price
c in $. We shall also suppose that both assets can be exchanged in arbitrary
ratio. The traders will be numbered by k ∈ N, N being the natural num-
bers. The k-th trader implements a strategy (called pure) which is denoted
by |ψ〉k and declares that his whole capital consisting of sk units of G and
dk monetary units will be engaged in market transactions. A player can be
present on the market in the shape of several traders what allows him to
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engage various parts his capital in different ways. The opposite situation is
also possible: several traders can form a coalition. Such a clique can be de-
scribed as correlated strategies of different traders. The actual participation
of the k-th trader in the market turnover would be decided by an arbiter
A who considers the data {|ψ〉k, sk, dk} coming from all traders. The role
of the arbiter A is performed by an appropriate clearinghouse who acts in
a fully deterministic way according to rules that are established by the law
or/and tradition. The arbiter A can be identified with the algorithm used
for clearing. Market transactions, that is capital flows, are settled according
to the strategies put forward by the traders |ψ〉k and the algorithm A. In
this way a common price c is set for all transaction in a given turn. If one
considers several markets connected by traders strategies then simultane-
ous transaction with different prices are possible (e.g. arbitrage is possible).
Note that the trader is not obliged to know the market rules but such knowl-
edge is necessary if he or she wants to act in a rational way.
The quantum model of market Let the real variable q
q := ln c− E(ln c) (1)
denotes the logarithm of the price at which the k-th player can buy G shifted
so that its expectation value in the state | ψ >k vanishes. The expectation
value of x is denoted by E(x). The variable p
p := E(ln c)− ln c (2)
describes the situation of a player who is supplying the asset G according to
his strategy |ψ〉k. Supplying G can be regarded as demanding $ at the price
c−1 in the 1G units and both definitions are equivalent. Note that we have
defined q and p so that they do not depend on possible choices of the units for
G and $. For simplicity we will use such units so E(ln c) = 0. The strategies
|ψ〉k belong to Hilbert spaces Hk. The state of the game |Ψ〉in :=
∑
k |ψ〉k
is a vector in the direct sum of Hilbert spaces of all players, ⊕kHk. We will
define canonically conjugate hermitian operators of demand Qk and supply
Pk for each Hilbert space Hk analogously to their physical counterparts
position and momentum. This can be justified in the following way. Let
exp(−p) be a definite price, where p is a proper value of the operator Pk.
Therefore, if one have already declared the will of selling exactly at the price
exp(−p) (the strategy given by proper the state |p〉k) then it is pointless to
put forward any opposite offer for the same transaction. The capital flows
resulting from an ensemble of simultaneous transactions correspond to the
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physical process of measurement. A transaction consists in a transition
from the state of traders strategies |Ψ〉in to the describing the capital flow
state |Ψ〉out := Tσ|Ψ〉in, where Tσ :=
∑
kd
|q〉kdkd〈q| +
∑
ks
|p〉ksks〈p| is the
projective operator given by the division σ of the set of traders {k} into
two separate subsets {k} = {kd}∪ {ks}, that is buying at the price eqkd and
selling at the price e−pks in the round of transaction in question. The role
of the algorithm A is to determine the division of the market σ, the set of
price parameters {qkd , pks} and the values of capital flows. The later are
settled by the distribution
∫ ln c
−∞
|〈q|ψ〉k |2
k〈ψ|ψ〉k
dq (3)
which is interpreted as the probability that the trader | ψ >k is willing to
buy the asset G at the transaction price c or lower [3]. In an analogous way
the distribution ∫ ln 1
c
−∞
|〈p|ψ〉k|2
k〈ψ|ψ〉k dp (4)
gives the probability of selling G by the trader | ψ >k at the price c or
greater. These probabilities are in fact conditional because they describe
the situation after the the division σ is completed.
Maximization of the capital turnover Every game is specified by its rules
so to illustrate the action of the algorithm A let us consider an example
of deterministic clearinghouse algorithm. Suppose that the clearinghouse
maximize the capital turnover at a uniform price c. The assumption of
unique for all traders price
∀kd,ks (Qkd + Pks)|Ψ〉out = 0
corresponds to entanglement in quantum theory. On the market where
transaction are made between two traders, the above condition may be ful-
filled only for every pair of traders separately. Let us for simplicity limit the
class of admissible strategies to those whose amplitudes 〈q|ψ〉k (〈p|ψ〉k) are
functions of the variable q (p) with compact supports and square-integrable.
After fixing the division σ we can rescale the amplitudes of supply and de-
mand so integrals of the squares of modules of the resulting functions 〈q|φ〉kd
and 〈p|φ〉ks
〈q|φ〉kd :=
√
dkd
〈q|ψ〉kd
kd〈ψ|ψ〉kd
, 〈p|φ〉ks :=
√
sks
〈p|ψ〉ks
ks〈ψ|ψ〉ks
(5)
3
measure the appropriate capital flows. For a transaction at the price c, the
maximal capital flow is the lowest number from the possible total buying
and selling
j(σ, c) := min
{∑
kd
∫ ln c
−∞
|〈q|φ〉kd |2dq , c
∑
ks
∫ − ln c
−∞
|〈p|φ〉ks |2dp
}
. (6)
The maximal value is given by the solution of the equation
∑
kd
∫ ln c∗
−∞
|〈q|φ〉kd |2dq = c∗
∑
ks
∫ − ln c∗
−∞
|〈p|φ〉ks |2dp. (7)
There is at least one solution of the Eq. (7) because the functions are
continuous. If there are more solutions we may choose any of them. The
division σ∗ = (k∗s , k∗d) corresponding to the maximal capital flow
j(σ∗, c∗) = max
σ
j(σ, c∗)
gives the changes in the amounts of the asset G
1
c∗
∫ ln c∗
−∞
|〈q|φ〉k∗
d
|2dq , −
∫ − ln c∗
−∞
|〈p|φ〉k∗s |2dp (8)
and the money $
−
∫ ln c∗
−∞
|〈q|φ〉k∗
d
|2dq , c∗
∫ − ln c∗
−∞
|〈p|φ〉k∗s |2dp (9)
possessed by the traders after clearing the round of transactions. The Eq.
(7) guarantees that the capital changes will be balanced, so the described
game belongs to specially interesting zero sum class of game that do not
generate capital surplus nor demand capital inflow (we neglect such cost as
brokerage etc). Maximization of the G turnover results in different price
c∗ and capital flows. This asymmetry can be removed by separate normal-
ization of the strategies in Eq. (5) that is by replacing the square roots
by
√
dkd∑
ld
dld
and
√
sks∑
ls
sls
, [4] and performing calculations for probabilities
instead of capital flows. In this case the assumption of compactness of the
supports is superfluous. Deutsch arguments [4] can be repeated here to
show that the stochastic interpretation of the presented model is not nec-
essary. Note that the asymmetry justifies presentation of the supply and
demand curves in terms of probabilities and not capital flows [3]. Another,
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more quantum, algorithm can be defined if the transactions are made with
weights analogous to Eq. (6) for all possible divisions σ and prices c. Such
transactions should be balanced for not realized bids. This algorithm may
exclude some trades from round of transactions. The transaction operator
would resemble the commonly use in quantum theory scattering matrix:
Tσα := I + αd
∑
kd
|q〉kdkd〈q|+ αs
∑
ks
|p〉ksks〈p|,
where αd, αs ∈ R+, and I is the identity operator in
∑
k ⊕Hk.
Market as a measuring apparatus When a game allows a great number
of players in it is useful to consider it as a two-players game: the trader
|ψ〉k against the Rest of the World (RW). (The player RW has a lot in
common with a macroscopic measuring apparatus.) The concrete algorithm
A may allow for an effective strategy of RW (for a sufficiently large number
of players the single player strategy should not influence on the form of the
RW strategy). If one considers the RW strategy it make sense to declare
its simultaneous demand and supply states because for one player RW is a
buyer and for another it is a seller. To describe such situation it is convenient
to use the Wigner formalism [5]. The pseudo-probabilityW (p, q)dpdq on the
phase space {(p, q)} known as the Wigner function is given by
W (p, q) := h−1E
∫ ∞
−∞
eiℏ
−1
E
px 〈q + x2 |ψ〉〈ψ|q − x2 〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 dx
= h−2E
∫ ∞
−∞
eiℏ
−1
E
px 〈p+ x2 |ψ〉〈ψ|p − x2 〉
〈ψ|ψ〉 dx,
where the positive constant hE = 2πℏE is the dimensionless economical
counterpart of the Planck constant. Recall that this measure is not positive
definite except for the stated bellow cases. In the general case the pseudo-
probability density of RW is a countable linear combination of Wigner func-
tions, ρ(p, q) =
∑
n wnWn(p, q), wn ≥ 0,
∑
n wn = 1. According to Eq.
(3) and (4) (see also Ref. [3]) the diagrams of the integrals of the RW
pseudo-probabilities
Fd(ln c) :=
∫ ln c
−∞
ρ(p = const., q)dq (10)
(RW bids selling at exp (−p))
and
Fs(ln c) :=
∫ ln 1
c
−∞
ρ(p, q = const.)dp (11)
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(RW bids buying at exp q ) against the argument ln c may be interpreted
as the dominant supply and demand curves in Cournot convention, respec-
tively [3]. Note, that due to the lack of positive definiteness of ρ, Fd and Fs
may not be monotonic functions. Textbooks on economics give examples of
such departures from the low of supply (work supply) and low of demand
(Giffen assets) [6]. We will call an arbitrage algorithm resulting in non pos-
itive definite probability densities a giffen.
Quantum Zeno effect If the market continuously measures the same strat-
egy of the player, say the demand 〈q|ψ〉, and the process is repeated suffi-
ciently often for the whole market, then the prices given by the algorithm
A do not result from the supplying strategy 〈p|ψ〉 of the player. The nec-
essary condition for determining the profit of the game is the transition of
the player to the state 〈p|ψ〉 [3]. If, simultaneously, many of the players
changes their strategies then the quotation process may collapse due to the
lack of opposite moves. In this way the quantum Zeno effects explains stock
exchange crashes. Effects of this crashes should be predictable because the
amplitudes of the strategies < p|ψ〉 are Fourier transforms of < q|ψ〉 Another
example of the quantum market Zeno effect is the stabilization of prices of
an asset provided by a monopolist.
Eigenstates of Q and P Let us suppose that the amplitudes for the strate-
gies 〈q|ψ〉k or 〈p|ψ〉k that have infinite integrals of squares of their modules,
(〈q|ψ〉k 6∈ L2) have the natural interpretation as the will of the k-th player
of buying (selling) of the amount dk ( sk) of the asset G. So the strategy
〈q|ψ〉k = 〈q|a〉 = δ(q, a) means that in the case of classifying the player to
the set {kd}, refusal of buying cheaper than at c = ea and the will of buying
at any price equal or above ea. In the case of ”measurement” in the set {kd}
the player declares the will of selling at any price. The above interpreta-
tion is consistent with the Heisenberg uncertainty relation. The strategies
〈q|ψ〉2 = 〈q|a〉 (or 〈p|ψ〉2 = 〈p|a〉) do not correspond to the RW behaviour
because the conditions d2, s2 > 0, if always fulfilled, allow for unlimited
profits (the readiness to buy or sell G at any price). The demand Eq. (10)
and supply Eq. (11) functions give probabilities of coming off transactions
in the game when the player use the strategy 〈p|const〉 or 〈q|const〉 and
RW, proposing the price, use the strategy ρ. The authors have analyzed
the efficiency of the strategy 〈q|ψ〉1 = 〈q| − a〉 in a two-player game when
RW use the strategy with squared module of the amplitude equal to normal
distribution [3]. The maximal intensity of the profit [3] is equal to 0.27603
times the variance of the RW distribution function. Of course, the strategy
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〈p|ψ〉1 = 〈p|0, 27603〉 has the same properties. In such games a=0.27603
is a global fixed point of the profit intensity function. This may explain
the universality of markets on which a single client facing the bid makes
up his/hers mind. Does it mean that such common phenomena have quan-
tal nature? The Gaussian strategy of RW [7] can be parametrized by the
temperature T = β−1 (see below). Any decrease in profits is only possible
by reducing the variance of RW (i.e. cooling). Market competition is the
mechanism responsible for risk flow that allows the market to attain the
thermodynamical balance. A warmer market influences destructively on the
cooler traders and they diminish the uncertainty of market prices.
Adiabatic strategies Financial mathematics teach us that the first mo-
ments of the random variables p and q measure the expected profit from one
transaction and the second moments measure the risk [8]. Therefore we will
define the observable
H(Pk,Qk) := (Pk − pk0)
2
2m
+
mω2(Qk − qk0)2
2
, (12)
where pk0 :=
k〈ψ|Pk |ψ〉k
k〈ψ|ψ〉k 6= E(Pk), qk0 := k
〈ψ|Qk|ψ〉k
k〈ψ|ψ〉k , ω :=
2pi
θ
, and call it the
risk inclination operator, cf Ref. [3]. θ denotes the characteristic time of
transaction introduced in the MM model [3]. The parameter m > 0 mea-
sures the risk asymmetry between buying and selling positions. Analogies
with quantum harmonic oscillator allow for the following characterization of
quantum market games. The constant hE describes the minimal inclination
of the player to risk. It is equal to the product of the lowest eigenvalue
of H(Pk,Qk) and 2θ. Note that 2θ is the minimal interval during which
it makes sense to measure the profit [3]. Except the ground state all the
adiabatic strategies H(Pk,Qk)|ψ〉 = const|ψ〉 are giffens [5]. Future investi-
gations may reveal the situations foe which the existence of giffens lead to
optimal strategies.
It should be noted here that in a general case the operators Qk do not
commute because traders observe moves of other players and often act ac-
cordingly. One big bid can influence the market at least in a limited time
spread. Therefore it is natural to consider noncommutative quantum me-
chanics [9] where one considers
[xi, xk] = iΘik := Θǫik.
The analysis of harmonic oscillator in more then one dimensions [10] imply
that the parameter Θ modifies the constant hE →
√
h2E +Θ
2 and, accord-
ingly, the eigenvalues of H(Pk,Qk). This has the natural interpretation that
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moves performed by other players can diminish or increase one’s inclination
to taking risk.
Correlated coherent strategies We will define correlated coherent strate-
gies as the eigenvectors of the annihilation operator Ck [11]
Ck(r, η) := 1
2η
(
1 +
ir√
1− r2
)
Qk + iηPk,
where r is the correlation coefficient r ∈ [−1, 1], η > 0. In these strategies
buying and selling transactions are correlated and the product of dispersions
fulfills the Heisenberg-like uncertainty relation ∆p∆q
√
1− r2 ≥ ℏE2 and is
minimal. The annihilation operators Ck and their eigenvectors may be pa-
rameterized by ∆p =
ℏE
2η , ∆q =
η√
1−r2 i r This leads to following form of the
correlated Wigner coherent strategy
W (p, q)dpdq =
1
2π∆p∆q
√
1− r2 e
− 1
2(1−r2)
( (p−p0)
2
∆2p
+
2r(p−p0)(q−q0)
∆p∆q
+
(q−q0)
2
∆2q
)
dpdq.
They are not giffens. It can be shown, following Hudson [12], that they
form the set of all pure strategies with positive definite Wigner functions.
Therefore pure strategies that are not giffens are represented in phase space
{(p, q)} by gaussian distributions.
Mixed states and thermal strategies According to classics of game theory
[13] the biggest choice of strategies is provided by the mixed states ρ(p, q).
Among them the most interesting are the thermal ones. They are charac-
terized by constant inclination to risk, E(H(P,Q)) = const and maximal
entropy. The Wigner measure for the n-th exited state of harmonic oscillator
have the form [5]
Wn(p, q)dpdq =
(−1)n
πℏE
e
− 2H(p,q)
ℏEω Ln(
4H(p, q)
ℏEω
)dpdq,
where Ln is the n-th Laguerre polynomial. The mixed state ρβ deter-
mined by the Wigner measures Wndpdq weighted by the Gibbs distribution
wn(β) :=
e−βnℏEω∑
∞
k=0 e
−βkℏEω
have the form
ρβ(p, q)dpdq : =
∞∑
n=0
wn(β)Wn(p, q)dpdq
=
ω
2π
x e−xH(p,q)
∣∣∣
x= 2
ℏEω
tanh(β
ℏEω
2
)
dpdq.
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So it is a two dimensional normal distribution. It easy to notice that by
recalling that 11−t e
xt
t−1 =
∑∞
n=0 Ln(x)t
n is the generating function for the
Laguerre polynomials. It seems to us that the above distributions should de-
termine the shape of the supply and demand curves for equilibrium markets.
There is no giffens on such markets. It would be interesting to investigate
the temperatures of equilibrium markets. In contrast to the traders temper-
atures [7] which are Legendre coefficients and measure ”trader’s qualities”
market temperatures are related to risk and are positive. The Feynman path
integrals may be applied to the Hamiltonian Eq. (12) to obtain equilibrium
quantum Bachelier model of diffusion of the logarithm of prices of shares
that can be completed by the Black-Scholes formula for pricing European
options [14].
Market cleared by quantum computer When the algorithm A calculat-
ing in a separable Hilbert space Hk does not know the players strategies it
must choose the basis in an arbitrary way. This may result in arbitrary long
representations of the amplitudes of strategies. Therefore the algorithm A
should be looked for in the NP (non-polynomial) class and quantum markets
may be formed provided the quatum computation technology is possible. Is
the quantum arbitrage possible only if there is a unique correspondence be-
tween ℏ and hE? Penrose ideas concerning the thinking process suggest
searching for new physical phenomena (e.g. giffens) on markets, where now
the clearing algorithms A are constructed in a non-computational way [15].
Was the hypothetical evidence given by Robert Giffen in the British Parlia-
ment [16] the first ever description of quantum phenomenon? The market
exchange mechanism has inspired the so called transactional interpretation
of quantum mechanics [17]. The commonly accepted universality of quan-
tum theory should encourage physicist in looking for traces quantum world
in social phenomena.
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